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Abstract: We propose several connectedness measures built from pieces of variance decom-
positions, and we argue that they provide natural and insightful measures of connectedness
among nancial asset returns and volatilities. We also show that variance decompositions de-
ne weighted, directed networks, so that our connectedness measures are intimately-related
to key measures of connectedness used in the network literature. Building on these in-
sights, we track both average and daily time-varying connectedness of major U.S. nancial
institutions' stock return volatilities in recent years, including during the nancial crisis of
2007-2008.
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you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind:
it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts,
advanced to the stage of science."
[Kelvin (1891)]
\None of us anticipated the magnitude of the ripple eects."
[Merrill Lynch President Gregory Fleming
on the nancial crisis of 2007-2008,
as reported in Lowenstein (2010)]
1 Introduction
Connectedness would appear central to modern risk measurement and management, and
indeed it is. It features prominently in key aspects of market risk (return connectedness
and portfolio concentration), credit risk (default connectedness), counter-party and grid-
lock risk (bilateral and multilateral contractual connectedness), and not least, systemic risk
(system-wide connectedness). It is also central to understanding underlying fundamental
macroeconomic risks, in particular business cycle risk (intra- and inter-country real activity
connectedness).
Perhaps surprisingly, then, connectedness remains a rather elusive concept, in many
respects incompletely dened and poorly measured. Correlation-based measures remain
widespread, for example, yet they measure only pairwise association and are largely wed
to linear Gaussian thinking, making them of limited value in nancial-market contexts.
Dierent authors chip away at this situation in dierent ways. The equi-correlation approach
of Engle and Kelly (2009), for example, uses average correlations across all pairs. The
CoVaR approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and the marginal expected shortfall
approach of Acharya et al. (2010) track association between individual-rm and overall-
market movements and also rely less on linear Gaussian methods. Although these and
various other measures are certainly of interest, they measure dierent things, and a unied
framework remains elusive.
To address this situation, in this paper we develop and apply a unied framework for
conceptualizing and empirically measuring connectedness at a variety of levels, from pairwisethrough system-wide, via variance decompositions from approximating models. In section 2
we introduce the conceptual framework and measures, in population. In section 2.4 we relate
our measures to some of those in the burgeoning network literatures; the relationships turn
out to be direct and important. In section 3 we treat the sample estimation of connectedness,
with detailed attention to allowing for its time-variation. Finally, in section 4, we apply our
framework to study connectedness at all levels among a large set of return volatilities of
U.S. nancial institutions during the last decade, including during the nancial crisis of
2007-2008. We conclude in section 5.
2 Population Connectedness
Our approach to connectedness is based on assessing shares of forecast error variation in
various locations (rms, markets, countries, etc.) due to shocks arising elsewhere. This
is intimately related to the familiar econometric notion of a variance decomposition, in
which the forecast error variance of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the
various variables in the system. We denote by dH
ij the ij-th H-step variance decomposition
component; that is, the fraction of variable i's H-step forecast error variance due to shocks
in variable j. All of our connectedness measures { from simple pairwise to system-wide {
are based on the \non-own," or \cross," variance decompositions, dH
ij, i;j = 1;:::;N, i 6= j.
The key is i 6= j.
2.1 The Population Data-Generating Process
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process (DGP) with or-
thogonal shocks: xt = (L)ut, (L) = 0 + 1L + 2L2 + :::, E(utu0
t) = I. Note that 0
need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are contained in this very general repre-
sentation. In particular, contemporaneous aspects of connectedness are summarized in 0,
and dynamic aspects in f1;2;:::g. Nevertheless, attempting to understand connectedness
via the potentially many hundreds of coecients in f0;1;2;:::g is typically fruitless. One
needs a transformation of f0;1;2;:::g that better reveals and more compactly summa-
rizes connectedness. Variance decompositions achieve this.


































i 6= 1 i 6= 2 i 6= N i 6= j
Table 1: Connectedness Table Schematic. See Text for details.
2.2 The Population Connectedness Table
The simple Table 1, which we call a connectedness table, proves central for understanding
the various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left N N block
contains the variance decompositions. For future reference we call that upper-left block a
\variance decomposition matrix," and we denote it by DH = [dH
ij]. The connectedness table
simply augments DH with a rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom row containing
column sums, and a bottom-right element containing the grand average, in all cases for i 6= j.
The o-diagonal entries of DH are the parts of the N forecast-error variance decompo-
sitions of relevance from a connectedness perspective; in particular, they measure pairwise




i j = d
H
ij:
Note that in general CH
i j 6= CH
j i, so there are N2   N separate pairwise directional con-
nectedness measures. They are analogous to bilateral imports and exports for each of a set
of N countries.
Sometimes we are interested in net, as apposed to gross, pairwise directional connected-









2 net pairwise directional connectedness measures, analogous to bilateral trade
balances.
Now consider not the individual elements of DH, but rather its o-diagonal row or column
sums. Take the rst row, for example. The sum of its o-diagonal elements gives the share of
3the H-step forecast-error variance of variable 1 coming from shocks arising in other variables
(all other, as opposed to a single other). Hence we call the o-diagonal row and column
sums, labeled \from" and \to" in the connectedness table, the total directional connectedness




















There are 2N total directional connectedness measures, N \to others," or \transmitted,"
and N \from others," or \received," analogous to total exports and total imports for each
of a set of N countries.
Just as with pairwise directional connectedness, sometimes we are interested in net total





 i   C
H
i :
There are N net total directional connectedness measures, analogous to the total trade
balances of each of a set of N countries.
Finally, the grand total of the o-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of the











There is just one total connectedness measure, as total connectedness distills a system into
a single number analogous to total world exports or total world imports. (The two are of
course identical.)
The connectedness table makes clear how one can begin with the most disaggregated
1Note that we construct total connectedness by taking o-diagonal DH variation relative to total DH
variation (N), so that CH is expressed as a decimal share, as with \from" total directional connectedness.
4(e.g., microeconomic, rm-level, pairwise-directional) connectedness measures and aggregate
them in various ways to obtain macroeconomic economy-wide total directional and total
connectedness measures. Dierent agents may be relatively more interested in one or another
of the measures. For example, rm i may be maximally interested in how various others
connect to it (CH
i j, for various j), or how all others connect to it, CH
i . In contrast,
regulators might be more concerned with identifying systemically important rms j, in the
sense of large total directional connectedness to others from j, CH
 j, and they might also be
more concerned with monitoring total (system-wide) connectedness CH.
2.3 Correlated Shocks
In the orthogonal structural system discussed thus far, the variance decompositions are eas-
ily calculated, because orthogonality ensures that the variance of a weighted sum is simply
an appropriately-weighted sum of variances. But reduced-form shocks are rarely orthogo-
nal. To identify uncorrelated structural shocks from correlated reduced-form shocks, one
must, inescapably, make assumptions. Sometimes this is more-or-less transparent, as in the
Cholesky-factor vector autoregression (VAR) identications popularized by Sims (1980), or in
any of the scores of subsequent \structural" VAR identications. Sometimes it is less trans-
parent, but equally true, as in the generalized variance decomposition (GVD) framework
of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), or in more deeply-structural dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium approaches like DiNicolo and Lucchetta (2010), which embody
large sets of maintained assumptions.
Identifying assumptions are just that { assumptions { and any set of identifying assump-
tions may fail. Results based on traditional Cholesky-factor identication, for example, may
be sensitive to ordering, as Cholesky-factor identication amounts to assumption of a partic-
ular recursive ordering. Many models, moreover, are exactly- as opposed to over-identied,
so that the identifying restrictions cannot be tested. The upshot is that reasonable people
may disagree as to their preferred assumptions, and they often do. We have nothing new to
add; one must make an assumption and move forward conditional upon (and cognizant of)
the assumption.
Our own preferences run toward Cholesky and related identications such as GVD. We
often nd that total connectedness is robust to Cholesky ordering; that is, the range of total
connectedness estimates across orderings is often quite small. Directional connectedness,
however, is sometimes more sensitive to Cholesky ordering, which enhances the appeal of
GVDs. Like Cholesky-factor variance decompositions, GVDs rely on a largely data-based
5identication scheme, but they are independent of ordering.2
GVDs were introduced in Pesaran and Shin (1998), which builds on Koop et al. (1996).3
The H-step generalized variance decomposition matrix DgH = [d
gH
















where ej is a selection vector with jth element unity and zeros elsewhere, h is the coecient
matrix multiplying the h-lagged shock vector in the innite moving-average representation
of the non-orthogonalized VAR,  is the covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-
orthogonalized VAR, and jj is the jth diagonal element of .4 Because shocks are not
necessarily orthogonal in the GVD environment, sums of forecast error variance contributions
are not necessarily unity (that is, row sums of Dg are not necessarily unity).5 Hence we base
our generalized connectedness indexes not on Dg, but rather on ~ Dg = [~ d
g

















ij = N. Using ~ Dg we can immediately
calculate generalized connectedness measures ~ C, ~ C j, ~ Ci , ~ Ci, ~ Ci j, ~ Cj i, and ~ Cij.
2.4 Relationship to the Network Literature
Networks are everywhere in modern life, from power grids to Facebook. Not surprisingly,
research on networks has grown explosively in recent years.6 A network N is composed of N
nodes and L links between nodes. The distance sij between two nodes i and j is the smallest
number of links that must be traversed to go from i to j. N is connected if sij  N  1;8i;j,
and one is naturally led to think about measures of the strength of network connectedness.
That is, presumably two connected networks need not be equally strongly connected. But
then deep questions arise. Just what is strength of network connectedness? Is it a pairwise
or system-wide concept, or both, or neither? How, if at all, might it be related to the notion
of connectedness that we have proposed independently and thus far emphasized, based on
variance decompositions?
To approach the issue of measuring network connectedness, we need to analyze the math-
2GVDs of course make other assumptions, most notably normality of shock distributions. We will discuss
this later in our application to equity return volatilities in section 4.
3We refer the reader to the original papers for motivation and background.
4Note the typo in the original paper of Pesaran and Shin (1998), p. 20. They write 
 1




5We now drop the \H" superscripts, because from this point onward they are not needed for clarity.
6Newman (2010) and Jackson (2008) provide good general and economic introductions, respectively.
6ematical structure of networks a bit more deeply. A network is simply an N  N adjacency
matrix A of zeros and ones, A = [Aij], where Aij = 1 if nodes i and j are linked, and Aij = 0
otherwise. Note that A is symmetric, because if i and j are connected, then so too must be
j and i. Mathematically (i.e., algebraically), the adjacency matrix A is the network, and
all network properties are embedded in A. Hence any sensible connectedness measure must
be based on A. Nevertheless, there is no single, all-encompassing measure, and several have
been proposed.7 The most important and popular by far { as well as the most useful for
our purposes { are based on the idea of node degree (and a closely-related concept, network
diameter), to which we now turn.
2.4.1 Degree and Diameter








We can of course examine the pattern of degrees across nodes. The degree distribution is
the probability distribution of degrees across nodes. It is a discrete univariate distribution
with support 0;:::;(N  1), and aspects of its shape (location, scale, skewness, tail thickness,
etc.) are closely linked to aspects of network behavior.8 As regards the aspect of network
behavior that concerns us { connectedness { the location of the degree distribution is ob-
viously key, and the standard location measure is of course the mean. Hence the mean of
the degree distribution (\mean degree") has emerged as a canonical benchmark measure of
overall network connectedness. The larger the mean degree, the greater is overall network
connectedness.
The just-described adjacency matrix and degree distribution might more precisely be
called \1-step," as the links are direct. However, even if i is not directly linked to j, i may
be linked to k, and k to j, so that i and j are linked at a distance of two steps rather than
one. The distinction between 1-step and multi-step adjacency emphasizes distance. Recall
that, as introduced earlier, the distance sij between two nodes i and j is the smallest number
of links that must be traversed to go from i to j. Distance is a two-node property, in contrast
to degree, which is a single-node property. Closely related to the idea of distance is the idea
7 Bech and Atalay (2011) and Adamic et al. (2010) provide good reviews and nancial applications of
network-theoretic connectedness measures.
8The support of 0;:::;(N  1) stems from our adoption of the standard convention of writing Aii = 0;8i.
7of diameter. The diameter of a network is the maximum distance between any two nodes,
smax = maxi;jsij. Diameter is another canonical benchmark measure of overall network
connectedness. The smaller the network diameter, the greater is overall connectedness.
A beautiful large-N approximation relates network diameter, network mean degree and





This \network diameter grows only as lnN" approximation is typically introduced as a
mathematically-precise characterization of the \small-world" phenomenon, namely that di-
ameters tend to be small even for huge networks.10 For our purposes, however, it is useful
because it emphasizes in a very precise way the centrality of the mean degree as a measure
of network connectedness. As we shall now see, our earlier-proposed connectedness measures
are intimately related to certain network node degrees and mean degree.
2.4.2 Variance Decompositions as Weighted, Directed Networks
Interestingly, it turns out that our connectedness measures, early variants of which were
proposed in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) independently of the network literature, are closely
related to aspects of network connectedness. Indeed we are now in a position to notice that
variance decompositions are networks. More precisely, the variance decomposition matrix
D, which denes our connectedness table and all associated connectedness measures, is
a network adjacency matrix A. Hence network connectedness measures may be used in
conjunction with variance decompositions to understand connectedness among components.
The networks dened by variance decompositions, however, are rather more sophisti-
cated than the classical network structures sketched thus far. First, the adjacency matrix A
9See, for example, Newman (2010), p. 420. Erd} os-R enyi random networks have the simplest imaginable
probabilistic model of link formation: independent Bernoulli trials with xed probability . Hence the degree




(1   )N 1 . Erd} os-R enyi random networks have emerged as a
canonical benchmark, but they are sometimes poor descriptions of real-world networks, due for example
to strategic aspects of link formation such as clustering, which refers to the fact that in real networks
two \people" with a common \friend" are more likely to be friends than two randomly-selected people.
Interestingly, however, Watts and Strogatz (1998) have shown that the \network diameter grows only as
lnN" approximation nevertheless holds in networks with small clusters of linked nodes with just a few
long-range links.
10For example, for N = 300;000;000 (roughly the U.S. population) and mean degree E() = 20, network
diameter is still small (smax  6). That is, even if every person in the U.S. is linked to only twenty others
on average, then the approximate maximum number of steps needed to link any two people is nevertheless
only six.
8(variance decomposition matrix D) is not lled simply with 0-1 entries; rather, the entries
are weights, with some potentially strong and others potentially weak. Second, the links are
directed; that is, the strength of the ij link is not necessarily the same as that of the ji link,
so the adjacency matrix is generally not symmetric. Third, there are constraints on the row
sums of A. In particular, each row must sum to 1 because the entries are variance shares.




Aij: Note in particular that the
diagonal elements of A are no longer 0.
Weighted, directed versions of the earlier-introduced network connectedness statistics
are readily dened, including degrees, degree distributions, distances and diameters. For
example, node degrees are now obtained not by summing zeros and ones, but rather by
summing weights in [0;1]. Moreover, there are now \to-degrees" and \from-degrees," corre-







The from-degree distribution is the probability distribution of from degrees across nodes.






Aij: The to-degree distribution is the probability distribution of to degrees across
nodes. It is a univariate distribution with support on [0;N].
By now the relationships between our earlier-dened connectedness measures and those
used in the network literature should be apparent. First, our total directional connectedness
measures Ci  and C j are precisely the from-degrees and to-degrees, respectively, associ-
ated with the notes of the weighted directed network D. Second, our total connectedness
measure C is simply the mean degree of the network D (to or from { it's the same either
way, because the sum of all row sums must equal the sum of all column sums).
3 Sample Connectedness
Clearly C depends on the set of variables x whose connectedness is to be examined, the
predictive horizon H for variance decompositions, and the dynamics A(L), so we write
C(x;H;A(L)).12 In reality A(L) is unknown and must be approximated (e.g., using a
nite-ordered vector autoregression). Recognizing the centrality of the approximating model
adopted, we write C(x;H;A(L);M(L;)), where M(L;) is a dynamic approximating model
with nite-dimensional parameter . One hopes that M(L;)) is in some sense close to the
11Our to-degrees and from-degrees are often called \out-degrees" and \in-degrees" in the network literature.
12The same holds, of course, for the various directional connectedness measures, so we use C(x;H;A(L))
as a stand-in for all our connectedness measures.
9true population dynamics A(L) for some pseudo-true parameter conguration 0, but there
is of course no guarantee.
In addition, and crucially, we want to allow for time-varying connectedness, which allows
us to move from the static, unconditional, perspective implicitly adopted thus far, to a dy-
namic, conditional perspective. Time-varying A(L), and hence time-varying connectedness,
may arise for a variety of reasons. A(L) may evolve slowly with evolving tastes, technolo-
gies and institutions, or it may vary with the business cycle, or it may shift abruptly with
nancial market environment (e.g., crisis, non-crisis). Whether and how much A(L) varies
is ultimately an empirical matter and will surely dier across applications, but in any event
it would be foolish simply to assume it is constant. Hence we allow the connection table and
all of its elements to vary over time, and we write Ct(x;H;At(L);M(t)).
Finally, everything we have written thus far refers to the population, whereas in reality
we have available only nite samples of observed data. That is, we must use estimated
approximating models, so we write b Ct(x;H;At(L);M(^ t)), where the data sample runs from
t = 1;:::;T. To economize on notation we henceforth drop At(L), because it is determined by
nature rather than a choice made by the econometrician, relying on the reader to remember
its relevance and simply writing b Ct(x;H;M(^ t)). In what follows we successively discuss
aspects of x, H and M(^ t).
3.1 The Reference Universe, x
Connectedness measurements are dened only with respect to a reference universe, namely
the set of x's dening the object of interest to be studied. Choice of x has important implica-
tions for the appropriate approximating model; for example, x may (or may not) be strongly
serially correlated, conditionally heteroskedastic, or highly disaggregated. Connectedness
measurements generally will not, and should not, be robust to choice of reference universe.
Three sub-issues arise, which we call the \x object," the \x choice," and the \x frequency."
By x object we refer to the type of x variable studied, typically either returns or return
volatilities. By x choice we mean precisely which (and hence how many) x variables are
chosen for study. By x frequency we refer to the observational frequency of the x variables
(daily, monthly, ...). In this paper the x object is the natural log of realized equity return
volatility, the x choice is approximately fteen major U.S. nancial institutions, and the x
frequency is daily.13
13Taking logs converts realized volatilities to approximate normality, as emphasized in Andersen et al.
(2003).
103.2 The Predictive Horizon, H
Certain considerations in certain contexts may help guide selection of connectedness horizon,
H. For example, in risk management contexts, one might focus on H values consistent with
risk measurement considerations. H = 10, for example, would cohere with the 10-day value
at risk (V aR) required under the Basel accord. Similarly, in portfolio management contexts
one might link H to the rebalancing period.
The connectedness horizon is important particularly because it is related to issues of
dynamic connectedness (in the fashion of contagion) as opposed to purely contemporaneous
connectedness. To take a simple pairwise example, shocks to j may impact the forecast
error variance of i only with a lag, so that Ci j may be small for small H but nevertheless
larger for larger H.14 Intuitively, as the horizon lengthens there may be more chance for
connectedness to appear. Thus, in a sense, varying H lets us break connectedness into \long-
run," \short-run," etc. More precisely, as H lengthens we obtain a corresponding sequence of
conditional prediction error variance decompositions for which the conditioning information
is becoming progressively less valuable. In the limit as H ! 1, we obtain an unconditional
variance decomposition.
In this paper we anchor on a horizon of H = 12 days, but we also examine a range of
nearby H values. In a sense this provides a \robustness check," but as we argued above,
there is no reason why connectedness should be \robust" to H. Instead we view examination
of a menu of H values simply as an interesting part of a phenomenological investigation.
3.3 The Approximating Model, M(t)
A rst issue is choice of approximating model class. As discussed previously, many choices
are possible, ranging from traditional data-driven VAR approaches, to so-called \structural"
VARs, to fully-articulated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
A second issue is how to allow for time-varying connectedness, which is potentially of
central interest for risk measurement and management (e.g., over the business cycle, or
during nancial crises). But connectedness is simply a transformation of model parameters,
so allowance for time-varying connectedness eectively means allowance for time-varying
parameters in the approximating model.15 Linear models with time-varying parameters
14Such dynamic phenomena, and the rich patterns that are possible, are closely related to aspects of
multi-step Granger causality, as treated for example in Dufour and Renault (1998), Dufour and Taamouti
(2010), and the references therein.
15Connectedness may be a highly nonlinear phenomenon, and time-varying parameters are an important
11are actually very general nonlinear models, as emphasized in White's Theorem (Granger
(2008)).16
As with choice of approximating model class, many choices are possible to allow for
time-varying parameters. A simple and popular scheme involves use of a rolling estimation
window. To track time-varying connectedness in real-time, for example, we might use a uni-
form one-sided estimation window of width w, sweeping through the sample, at each period
using only the most recent w periods to estimate the approximating model and calculate
connectedness measures.17 We write ^ Ct(x;H;Mt w:t(^ ). The rolling-window approach has
the advantages of tremendous simplicity and coherence with a wide variety of possible un-
derlying time-varying parameter mechanisms. Rolling windows do, however, require choice
of window width w, in a manner precisely analogous to bandwidth choice in density estima-
tion. In this paper we use a VAR(3) approximating model with a one-sided rolling estimation
window of w = 100 days.18
4 Application to U.S. Financial Institution Return Volatil-
ities, 1999-2010
Thus far we have introduced tools for connectedness measurement and related them to tools
for describing the structure of weighted directed networks. We now put those tools to work,
using them to monitor and characterize the evolution of connectedness among major U.S.
nancial institutions before and during the 2007-2008 nancial crisis. Understanding such
nancial connectedness is of interest not only in terms of understanding nancial crises,
but also in terms of understanding the business cycle, as the nancial system's health has
important implications for real economic health.
We proceed in four steps. First, in section 4.1, we describe the data that we use to
measure nancial institution connectedness. Next, in section 4.2, we perform a full-sample
way to allow for nonlinearity. Ultimately we want to try to escape the shackles of linear, Gaussian, correlation-
based analysis, as in much recent work including H ardle et al. (2011).
16Interestingly, it seems that \White's Theorem" was neither written nor published by White. Instead,
White's Theorem appears in Granger (2008). Evidently Granger distilled the theorem from conversations
with White, and he named it White's Theorem.
17Alternatively, we might use an expanding- as opposed to rolling-sample estimator, ^ Ct(x;H;M1:t(^ ).
Unfortunately, however, expanding sample estimates become very slow to adapt as sample size gets large.
Another possibility is explicitly specifying a process for the dynamically evolving model parameters, as is
commonly done in a state-space framework using the Kalman lter for estimation.
18We also explore robustness to alternative choices of w.
12(static) analysis, in which we eectively characterize average, or unconditional, connected-
ness. This is of intrinsic interest, and it also sets the stage for section 4.3, where we perform
a rolling-sample (dynamic) analysis of conditional connectedness. Our ultimate interest lies
there; we monitor high-frequency (daily) connectedness as conditions evolve, sometimes grad-
ually and sometimes abruptly. Finally, in section 4.4, we \zoom in" on nancial institution
connectedness during the global nancial crisis of 2007-2008.
4.1 Data
Financial institutions are connected directly through counter-party linkages associated with
positions in various assets, through contractual obligations associated with services provided
to clients and other institutions, and through deals recorded in their balance sheets. High-
frequency analysis of nancial institution connectedness therefore might seem to require
high-frequency balance sheet and related information, which is generally unavailable.
Fortunately, however, we have available stock market returns and return volatilities,
which reect forward-looking assessments of many thousands of smart, strategic and often
privately-informed agents as regards precisely the relevant sorts of connections. We use that
data to measure connectedness and its evolution. It is important to note that we remain
agnostic as to how connectedness arises; rather, we take it as given and seek to measure it
correctly for a wide range of possible underlying causal structures.19
In this paper we study volatility connectedness, for at least two reasons. First, if volatility
tracks investor fear (e.g., the VIX is often touted as an \investor fear gauge"), then volatility
connectedness is the \fear connectedness" expressed by market participants as they trade.
We are interested in the level, variation, paths, patterns and clustering in precisely that
fear connectedness. Second, volatility connectedness is of special interest because we are
particularly interested in crises, and volatility is particularly crisis-sensitive.
Volatility is latent and hence must be estimated. In this paper we use realized volatility,
which has received signicant attention in recent years.20 For a given rm on a given day,
we construct daily realized return volatility using high-frequency intra-day data from the
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. In particular, we calculate daily realized volatility as the
sum of squared log price changes over the 78 5-minute intervals during trading hours, from
09:00-12:00 and 13:00-16:30.
19Obviously there are tradeos, but we prefer an approach that potentially achieves much under minimal
assumptions, in contrast to a more deeply structural approach that in principle could achieve even more,
but only under heroic assumptions, and which may not be robust to violations of those assumptions.
20For surveys see Andersen et al. (2006), Andersen et al. (2010) and Andersen et al. (2011).
13We treat realized volatility as the object of direct interest, as in Andersen et al. (2003).21
This is appropriate because for the large, heavily-traded rms that we examine, ve-minute
sampling is frequent enough largely to eliminate measurement error, yet infrequent enough
such that microstructure noise (e.g., due to bid-ask bounce) is not a concern. In addition,
and importantly, realized volatility actually is an object of direct interest, traded in the
volatility swap markets, in contrast to underlying quadratic variation or any other object
that realized volatility may or may not be construed as estimating.
Volatilities tend to be strongly serially correlated { much more so than returns, particu-
larly when observed at relatively high frequency. We will capture that serial correlation using
vector-autoregressive approximating models, as described earlier. Volatilities also tend to be
distributed asymmetrically, with a right skew, and approximate normality is often obtained
by taking natural logarithms. Hence we work throughout with log volatilities. This is helpful
not only generally, as normality-inducing transformations take us into familiar territory, but
also specically as we use generalized variance decompositions (Koop et al. (1996), Pesaran
and Shin (1998)), which invoke normality.
4.2 Static (Full-Sample, Unconditional) Analysis
Here we study stock return volatilities for thirteen major U.S. nancial institutions that
survived the crisis of 2007-2008. In Table 2 we list the rms, tickers, market capitalization
before and after the crisis, and critical episodes/dates during the crisis. Our sample includes
seven commercial banks, two investment banks, one credit card company, two mortgage
nance companies and one insurance company. Stocks of all rms except Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were included in the S&P500 prior to the sub-prime crisis of 2007.
Our sample begins in May 1999 and ends in April 2010. Starting in 1999 allows us to
include among our rms Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and U.S. Bancorp, all of which went
public in the late 1990s. Our sample also spans several important nancial market episodes
in addition to the crisis of 2007-2008.22 These include the dot-com bubble collapse of 2000,
the Enron scandal of October 2001, and the WorldCom/MCI scandal and bankruptcy of
July 2002. Hence we can not only assess connectedness of our rms during the crisis of
21This contrasts with an alternative approach that views realized volatility not as the direct object of
interest, but rather as an estimate of underlying quadratic variation. In that case one might want to
acknowledge estimation error explicitly, as in Hansen and Lunde (2010). Doing so will generally increase the
persistence of the estimated volatility dynamics.
22The 2007-2008 crisis may itself be split into the sub-prime / liquidity crisis of 2007 and the nancial
crisis of 2008.
14Market Cap.
Institution Ticker Business 12/29/06 12/31/09
J.P. Morgan JPM C-Bank 169 171
Wells Fargo WFC C-Bank 121 137
Bank of America BAC C-Bank 241 131
Citigroup C C-Bank 274 76
U.S. Bancorp USB C-Bank 64 43
Bank of New York Mellon BK C-Bank 30 34
PNC Group PNC C-Bank 22 24
American Express AXP Credit Cards 74 49
Goldman Sachs GS I-Bank 86 86
Morgan Stanley MS I-Bank 85 40
Fannie Mae FNM Mortgages 59 1.3
Freddie Mac FRE Mortgages 47 0.9
AIG AIG Insurance 187 4
Table 2: U.S. Financial Institution Detail. C-Bank denotes a commercial bank, and I-Bank denotes
an investment bank. Market capitalizations are in billions of U.S. dollars. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were placed into government conservatorship on September 7, 2008, and AIG began government ownership
on September 17, 2008.
2007-2008, but also compare and contrast connectedness during other episodes.
We include AIG because it was a major supplier of \nancial insurance" in the 2000s,
selling credit default swaps (CDSs) through its AIG Financial Products arm in London.
Although CDSs provided lucrative business for AIG early on, contributing close to 17% of
revenue in 2005, they singlehandedly brought down AIG as the nancial crisis of 2007-2008
spread across nancial markets.
The full-sample connectedness table appears as Table 3. Many features are notable.
Clear blocks of high pairwise directional connectedness appear, as with the GSEs (Freddie
and Fannie) and various investment banks. The diagonal elements (\own connectednesses")
tend to be the largest individual elements of the table, but total directional connectedness
(from others or to others) tends to be much larger, and total connectedness is a very high
78%. In addition, the spread of the \from" degree distribution is noticeably less than that
of the \to" degree distribution.
Let us discuss some of the features of the connectedness table at greater length, begin-
ning with the pairwise directional connectedness measures, ~ CH
i j, which are the o-diagonal
elements of the 13x13 matrix. A quick inspection of Table 3 shows that the highest pairwise
15AXP BAC BK C GS JPM MS PNC USB WFC AIG FNM FRE FROM
AXP 20.0 8.5 7.1 10.3 5.8 9.8 8.8 5.1 8.0 7.8 3.2 2.6 3.0 80.0
BAC 8.3 19.1 6.0 10.6 5.8 8.0 7.4 6.1 7.1 9.2 4.2 3.5 4.6 80.9
BK 8.4 8.3 18.8 8.4 6.2 9.3 8.5 5.7 8.4 8.3 4.2 2.4 3.0 81.2
C 9.5 9.6 5.4 20.4 4.9 8.7 7.8 5.2 7.0 8.0 5.4 3.5 4.7 79.6
GS 8.2 8.6 6.8 7.6 22.1 8.8 13.3 4.0 6.0 7.6 2.4 1.9 2.6 77.9
JPM 10.2 8.6 7.1 10.6 6.2 18.8 9.5 5.2 7.8 7.3 3.6 2.5 2.6 81.2
MS 9.2 8.3 7.1 8.9 9.8 9.7 20.5 4.2 5.5 7.1 3.4 2.8 3.6 79.5
PNC 7.7 8.8 7.4 8.5 4.6 7.6 6.6 18.1 7.6 8.8 5.2 4.2 4.9 81.9
USB 9.3 9.9 7.6 9.9 5.7 8.7 6.4 5.4 20.1 8.5 4.3 1.6 2.7 79.9
WFC 8.3 10.2 6.5 9.8 6.2 7.6 7.1 5.9 7.3 18.0 3.8 3.8 5.3 82.0
AIG 5.3 7.3 4.9 8.8 2.6 5.2 4.9 6.2 6.0 5.6 27.5 6.6 9.0 72.5
FNM 4.2 5.4 2.5 6.0 2.3 3.5 3.8 5.5 1.9 6.8 6.5 29.6 22.0 70.4
FRE 4.3 6.3 2.9 6.5 2.6 3.3 4.1 5.2 2.9 7.3 7.4 17.6 29.6 70.4
TO 92.9 99.7 71.3 106.1 62.7 90.2 88.2 63.7 75.5 92.2 53.8 53.1 68.1 78.3
NET 13.0 18.8 -9.9 26.5 -15.2 8.9 8.7 -18.2 -4.4 10.2 -18.7 -17.4 -2.3
Table 3: Full-Sample Connectedness Table. The sample is May 4, 1999 through April 30, 2010.
The ij-th entry of the upper-left 13x13 rm submatrix gives the ij-th pairwise directional connectedness;
i.e., the percent of 12-day-ahead forecast error variance of rm i due to shocks from rm j. The rightmost
(\FROM") column gives total directional connectedness (from); i.e., row sums (\from all others to i").
The bottom (\TO") row gives total directional connectedness (to); i.e., column sums (\to all others from
j"). The bottom-most (\NET") row gives the dierence in total directional connectedness (to-from). The
bottom-right element (in boldface) is total connectedness (mean \from" connectedness, or equivalently, mean
\to" connectedness).
connectedness measure observed is from Freddie Mac to Fannie Mae ( ~ CH
FNM FRE = 22%). In
return, the pairwise connectedness from Fannie Mae to Freddie Mac ( ~ CH
FRE FNM = 17:6%)
is ranked second. The two mortgage nance companies have been viewed very much as
twins by the markets and it is quite normal that their pairwise connectedness measures are
quite high. When we net the two gross measures out, the resulting net pairwise directional
connectedness from Freddie Mac to Fannie Mae is 4.6%, that is, ~ CH
FRE;FNM = 4:6%.
The next largest pairwise directional connectedness takes place from Morgan Stanley to
Goldman Sachs ( ~ CH
GS MS = 13:3%), the two top investment banks that were able to survive
the 2007-08 nancial crisis.23 While the connectedness from Goldman Sachs to Morgan
Stanley is also high ( ~ CH
MS GS = 9:8%), in net terms the directional connectedness takes
place from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs stock ( ~ CH
GS;MS = 3:5%).
23Since the other three investment banks ceased to exist in 2008, they are not included in the full sample
connectedness table.
16The highest values of pairwise directional connectedness measures among the commercial
bank stocks are observed to take place from Citigroup, on the one hand, and Bank of America
and J.P. Morgan, on the other ( ~ CH
BAC C = ~ CH
JPM C = 10:6%). A high value of pairwise
connectedness from Citigroup to either Bank of America and/or J. P. Morgan shows that
being the worst hit institution among the top ve commercial banks, Citigroup's stock spread
its troubles to the stocks of other top commercial banks.
As we have seen above, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are tightly connected to each other.
They are well connected with AIG as well. Pairwise directional connectedness of the stocks
of these three institutions with the stocks of other nancial institutions tends to be much
lower than connectedness of other bank stocks in our sample. We need to remind the reader
that these three institutions had lots of diculties during the 2007-08 nancial crisis and
could have gone bankrupt had the U.S. government not intervened in nancial markets in
September 2008.
The row sum of the pairwise connectedness measures results in the total directional
connectedness from others to each of the thirteen stocks (see Section 2). In other words, the
\FROM" column measures the share of volatility shocks received from other nancial rm
stocks in the total variance of the forecast error for each stock. By denition, it is equal to
100% minus the own share of the total forecast error variance. As the own-eects (diagonal
elements of the matrix) range between 18 and 30%, the total directional connectedness in
the \FROM" column ranges between 70 and 82%.
Similarly, the column sum of all pairwise connectedness measures results in the corre-
sponding stock's total directional connectedness to others. As each stock's contribution to
others' forecast error variances is not constrained to add up to 100%, entries in the \TO" row
can exceed 100%. While the nancial stocks are largely similar in terms of receiving volatil-
ity shocks from others, they are highly dierentiated as transmitters of volatility shocks to
others. The stark dierence between the distributions of the two connectedness measures is
clearly observed in their respective empirical survivor functions presented in Figure 1. Com-
pared to the very steep survivor function dened over a narrow range for the connectedness
from others, the survivor function for the connectedness to others is quite at and dened
over a wider range. Starting at a minimum of 70% for Fannie and Freddie and increasing
only up to a maximum of 82% for Wells Fargo and PNC Group, the total directional con-
nectedness from others is distributed rather tightly. The total directional connectedness to
others, on the other hand, varies from a low of 53% for Fannie Mae, to all the way up to






















Figure 1: Full-Sample Total Directional Connectedness: Empirical Survivor Functions. We
plot the empirical survivor functions for total directional connectedness \to" others and \from" others. The
predictive horizon for the underlying variance decomposition is 12 days.
range of just 12 points for the connectedness from others.
The largest commercial banks (as of 2010) were the ones that have the highest values
of connectedness (all exceeding 90%) to others. Being the most vulnerable among them,
Citigroup generated a total directional connectedness measure of 106% to others. Besides
the top four commercial banks, American Express Bank also generated signicant (93%)
volatility connectedness to others.
The dierence between the total directional connectedness to others and the total direc-
tional connectedness from others gives the net total directional connectedness to others( ~ CH
i =
~ CH
 i   ~ CH
i ). In terms of the net total directional connectedness Citigroup (26.5%) leads
the way, followed by Bank of America (18.8%), American Express (13%), and J. P. Morgan
(8.9%). AIG (-19%), PNC Group (-18%), Fannie Mae (-17%), Goldman Sachs (-15%) and
Bank of New York Mellon (-10%) are the nancial institutions with negative values of net
total directional connectedness to others.
Finally, with a value of 78.3% the measure of total connectedness among the thirteen
nancial stocks is higher than the total connectedness measures we obtained in other set-
tings, such as the connectedness among dierent asset classes, or among international stock
18markets. Given the large number of stocks included in the sample, there is a high degree
of connectedness for the full sample. As we will see below there is always a high degree of
connectedness even during tranquil times. There is another reason for the total connected-
ness for a set of nancial stocks to be higher than for a set of major national stock markets
around the world or for a set of asset classes in the U.S. As the institutions included in our
analysis are all operating in the nance industry, both industry-wide and macroeconomic
shocks aect each one of these stocks one way or the other. As some of these institutions
and their stocks are more vulnerable to external and/or industry-wide shocks than others,
they are likely to be transmitting these shocks to other nancial stocks, generating a higher
degree of connectedness to others. Obviously, to the extent that they have important im-
plications for the rest of the industry, idiosyncratic volatility shocks are also transmitted to
other stocks. For that reason, compared to a similar number of stocks from dierent indus-
tries, the connectedness for a group of stocks in the nance industry is likely to be higher.
It is also likely to be higher compared to the connectedness for a group of global markets, as
these markets are not subject to common shocks as frequently as the stocks from the nance
industry.24
4.3 Dynamic (Rolling-Sample, Conditional) Analysis
The just-completed analysis of full-sample connectedness provides a good characterization
of \average" or \unconditional" aspects of each of the connectedness measures, yet by con-
struction it is silent as to connectedness dynamics. In this sub-section we provide a dynamic
analysis by using rolling estimation windows. We include the same thirteen nancial insti-
tutions that we included in our earlier full-sample analysis.25
In contrast to our theoretical discussion in section 2, as well as our static empirical
analysis in section 4.2, in which we progressed from \micro to macro" { that is, from pairwise
connectedness, to total directional connectedness, to total connectedness { here it proves
useful to proceed in reverse order, from macro to micro. We start our dynamic analysis with
total connectedness, and then we move to various levels of disaggregation (total directional
and pairwise directional). Finally, we also provide a brief assessment of the robustness of
our results to choices of tuning parameters and alternative identication methods.
24We have in mind a comparison with the total connectedness indexes reported in Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2011).
25In the next sub-section we specically focus on the 2007-08 nancial crisis and include the remaining



























Figure 2: Rolling Total Connectedness. The rolling estimation window width is 100 days, and the
predictive horizon for the underlying variance decomposition is 12 days.
4.3.1 Total
In Figure 2 we plot total volatility connectedness over 100-day rolling-sample windows. From
a bird's-eye perspective, the total connectedness plot in Figure 2 has some revealing patterns.
It has two big cycles; one starting in late-2000 and ending in mid-2003, whereas the second
coincides with the development of the global nancial crisis from early 2007 all the way to
the end of 2009. The rst cycle coincides with the burst of the dot-com bubble, followed by
the downward spiral in the Nasdaq and other stock exchanges and the 2001 recession. Even
if the recession was over in early 2002, the MCI WorldCom scandal of mid-2002 kept the
volatility of the nancial stocks and their connectedness high for another year. The second
cycle started at the end of February 2007. With the rst signs of the sub-prime crisis, the
total volatility connectedness index jumped up from a low of around 56% in February 2007
to reach close to 90% in August 2007 and stayed above 80% until mid-2009.
In between the two big cycles of the total connectedness lie three smaller, but not nec-
essarily negligible, cycles. We will discuss each of these cycles along with the events that
possibly led to them. Before doing so, let us point to another fact that emerges from the
total connectedness plot. From 1999 to 2007, whenever the total connectedness increased
to a higher level, it always came back down to the 55-65% range as the sample-windows
are rolled to leave that episode behind. Following the 2007-08 nancial crisis, the total con-
nectedness index stayed well above this range as of the end of April 2010, even though the
nancial crisis had ended almost a year before.
Earlier on in our sample, developments in the tech-heavy Nasdaq stock exchange inu-
enced the behavior of the total volatility connectedness among the nancial stocks. Starting
in March 2000, the so-called dot-com bubble nally started to burst. The bursting of the
20dot-com bubble had a serious impact on the total volatility connectedness of nancial stocks.
In March 2000, the volatility connectedness index increased by 7 percentage points. Despite
short spells of recovery, troubles of the internet stocks continued for some time and solid
signs of an imminent recession appeared on the horizon. The volatility in the bank stocks
increased rapidly over this period, and so did the total volatility connectedness. From a low
of 60% in early September, the connectedness index increased to 75% by mid-January 2001
and further to surpass 80% by early May 2001.
The Federal Reserve's intervention, by way of lowering the fed funds target rate by 2.5
percentage points in the rst ve months of 2001, helped stem the decline in the Nasdaq and
other markets toward the second and third quarters of 2001. Total connectedness declined to
71% by early September 2001. However, 9/11 terrorist attacks worsened market sentiment
again. Even though the markets were closed for a week after the terrorist attacks, the total
connectedness among the nancial stocks jumped 10 percentage points in the week it was
reopened. The total connectedness stayed around 80% as long as the data for 9/11 were
included in the rolling-sample windows.
After the Enron scandal of late 2001, which did not have much impact on nancial
stocks, another corporate scandal rocked the U.S. nancial markets toward the end of June
2002. This time around it was the bankruptcy of the MCI WorldCom, which was once the
second-largest long distance phone company in the U.S. Unlike the Enron scandal, the MCI
WorldCom scandal had a serious impact on major bank stocks. All major U.S. banks had
credit positions with MCI WorldCom and hence they all suered losses when the company
declared bankruptcy.
Following the bankruptcy, the total connectedness among the major nancial institutions
jumped from 72% to reach 85% in July 2002, the highest level achieved from the beginning of
the sample. However, being an isolated source of loss for the banks, the scandal's impact on
the nancial system as a whole could be contained. As of the end of 2002 total connectedness
subsided very quickly to pre-July 2002 levels. After a brief increase following the invasion of
Iraq in March 2003, the total connectedness declined to 58% in August 2003.
From August 2003 to February 2007, the total connectedness index went through three
smaller cycles, during which it moved within the 55{80% range. The rst cycle lasted from
August 2003 to March 2005; the second from April 2005 to February 2006; and the third
from March 2006 to February 2007. The three cycles mostly coincide with the tightening of
monetary policy and its impact on the behavior of long-term interest rates.26
26The link between the volatility connectedness and the long-term rates is directly a result of the choices
214.3.2 Total Directional
The dynamic analysis of total connectedness gave us a clear understanding of the factors
inuencing the volatility connectedness across major U.S. nancial stocks over the 1999-2010
period. Keeping this analysis in the back of our minds, we can now focus on the dynamics
of directional connectedness over time.
Figure 3 presents the time series of total directional connectedness (\to" and \from"
degrees) separately for each rm. The plots for total directional connectedness \to" others
are presented in the upper panel, the plots for total directional connectedness \from" others
are in the middle panel, and the plots for \net" total directional connectedness to others are
in the lower panel.
One of the rst things one notices in Figure 3 is the substantial dierence between the
\to" and \from" connectedness plots: The \from" connectedness plots are much smoother
compared to the \to" connectedness plots. The dierence between the two directional con-
nectedness measures is not hard to explain. When there is a shock to the return volatility of
an individual stock or a couple of stocks, this volatility shock is expected to be transmitted to
other stocks. Since individual institutions' stocks are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, some
of these shocks are very small and negligible, while others can be quite large. Irrespective
of the size of the volatility shock, if it is the stock of a larger institution or a highly cen-
tral institution (which has strong balance-sheet and o-balance-sheet connections with other
banks) that received the volatility shock, then one can expect this volatility shock to have
even a larger spillover eect on stocks of other institutions. As the size of the shocks vary as
well as the size and centrality of the institutions in our sample, the directional connectedness
\to" others varies substantially across stocks over the rolling-sample windows.
We have already emphasized that the institutions in our sample are the largest ones in the
U.S. nancial industry. As a result, none of the stocks in our sample of thirteen institutions
are insulated from the volatility shocks to other institutions' stocks. In other words, they
are expected to be interconnected. As a result, each one will receive, in one form or the
other, the volatility shocks transmitted by other institutions. While the volatility shocks
transmitted \to" others by each individual stock may be large, when they are distributed
among twelve other stocks the size of the volatility shock received by each stock will be much
smaller. That is why there is much less variation in the directional connectedness \from"
of the investors. Rising long-term interest rates reect optimism about the future economic performance.
As they expect the growth to pick up, investors sell more defensive stocks such as the nancial stocks and
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Figure 3: Rolling Total Directional Connectedness. The rolling estimation window width is 100
days, and the predictive horizon for the underlying variance decomposition is 12 days.
23others compared to the directional connectedness \to" others in Figure 3.
The dierence between the directional connectedness \to" and \from" others is equal
to the \net" directional connectedness to others presented in the lower panel of Figure 3.
As the connectedness \from" others measure is smoother over the rolling-sample windows,
the variation in the plots for \net" connectedness to others over the rolling-sample windows
resembles the variation in the plots for connectedness \to" others.
In Figure 3 we observe that even though for each stock the \from" connectedness reached
the highest levels during the 2007-08 crisis, we do not observe such a level shift in the \to" and
\net" connectedness measures over the same period. This is so, perhaps because idiosyncratic
shocks have always hit individual stocks and these shocks have been transmitted to other
stocks. During the 2007-08 crisis these shocks became more frequent and each time hit more
stocks than before the crisis and hence were transmitted to others in larger amounts than
before.
In order to better evaluate the dierences between the \to" and \from" directional con-
nectedness, in Figure 4 we plot the evolution of the entire \to" and \from" degree dis-
tributions. Although, by denition, the mean \to" and "from" directional connectedness
measures are both equivalent to the total connectedness measure presented in Figure 2, each
nancial institution has rather dierent \to" and \from" directional connectedness. This
implies that even though their means are the same, \to" and \from" connectedness mea-
sures are distributed quite distinctively. As emphasized earlier, the variation in the \from"
connectedness is much lower than the variation in \to" connectedness. Even the rst and
second quartile band for the \to" connectedness is wider than the min-max range for the
\from" connectedness.
Temporal changes in the dispersion and skew of the \to" and \from" connectedness in
Figure 4 may contain useful information. For example, it appears that \from" connectedness
gets not only more dispersed but also more left-skewed during crises, and simultaneously that
\to" connectedness gets more right-skewed. That is, during crisis times relatively more than
non-crisis times, there are a few rms receiving very little, and a few rms transmitting very
much. One might naturally want to identify rms that are simultaneously \recipients of
small" and \transmitters of big" { those are the distressed rms potentially poised to wreak





















Figure 4: Rolling Distribution of Total Directional Connectedness. We plot the time series of
daily min, 25%, mean, 75%, and max of the distributions of\to" and \from" total directional connectedness.
The rolling estimation window width is 100 days, and the predictive horizon for the underlying variance
decomposition is 12 days.
4.3.3 Pairwise Directional
In the analysis of the full-sample volatility connectedness in Section 4.2, we discussed the
importance of pairwise volatility connectedness measures. In particular, we emphasized the
importance of pairwise connectedness as a measure of how volatility shocks are transmitted
across nancial institution stocks. The relevance of the pairwise connectedness measures
carries over to the rolling sample windows. Indeed, the analysis of pairwise connectedness
is even more crucial in the rolling sample windows case, because it helps us identify how
the connectedness measures across nancial institution stocks vary over time. During times
of crises, individual stocks are likely to be subject to frequent volatility shocks. How these
shocks led to volatility connectedness across pairs of stocks is very crucial for any analysis of
crises. Unfortunately, given that there are 13 institutions in our sample from 1999 to 2010,
presenting plots of the volatility connectedness (for each of the 156 pairwise directional mea-
sures, and 78 net pairwise directional measures) is an almost impossible task to accomplish
in the connes of this article. Instead, when we are discussing the development of the global
nancial crisis over time and the volatility connectedness of the most troubled nancial insti-
tutions during the crisis, we will present and discuss the net pairwise connectedness measures
during the most critical days of the crisis.
254.3.4 Robustness Assessment
Finally, we conclude this section with a discussion of the robustness of our results to the
choice of the parameters of the model. In particular, we plot the total connectedness for
two alternative identication methods (namely, the Cholesky factor identication and the
generalized identication), for alternative values of the window width (in addition to w = 100
days, we consider sample windows of 75 and 125 days), and for alternative forecast horizons
(in addition to H = 12 days, we consider 6 and 18 days). The results are presented in
Figure 5. In each plot, the solid line is the total connectedness measure obtained through
the generalized identication for each value of H and w. In the case of Cholesky factor
identication, we calculate the connectedness index for 100 random orderings of the realized
stock return volatilities. The gray band in each plot corresponds to the (10%,90%) interval
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Figure 5: Robustness of Total Connectedness We explore estimation window widths w of 75, 100
and 125 days, predictive horizons H of 6, 12 and 18 days, and a variety of Cholesky orderings. In each
sub-graph, the solid line corresponds to our benchmark ordering, and the gray band corresponds to a [10%,
90%] interval based on 100 randomly-selected orderings.
In all subgraphs, the solid line that corresponds to the generalized identication-based
total connectedness measure runs higher than the gray band that corresponds to the Cholesky
identication. As the generalized identication treats each variable to be ordered as the rst
variable in the VAR system, the total connectedness obtained from the Cholesky-based
26identication is the lower bound of the one obtained from the generalized identication.
Nevertheless, in all subgraphs of Figure 5, the two series move very much in accordance over
time, a strong indication of the robustness of our total connectedness measures based on
generalized identication. It is also important to note that the (10%,90%) interval based
on 100 random orderings of the Cholesky-based total connectedness is quite narrow. The
ordering of the nancial stocks in the VAR do not really matter much to follow the dynamic
behavior of total connectedness.
As the window length, w, is increased, the gap between total connectedness based on
the generalized identication and the one based on the Cholesky identication increases.
Both connectedness measures are more wiggly when the window width is set to 75 days, but
become smoother as we increase the window width to 125 days. Similarly, given the window
length, a shorter forecast horizon, H, implies a smaller gap between the generalized- and
Cholesky-based total connectedness measures.
To summarize, our robustness checks show that the dynamic behavior of the total con-
nectedness measures over the rolling-sample windows is robust to the choice of alternative
sample window lengths, forecast horizons, identication methods and orderings of stocks in
the VAR system.
4.4 The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008
Having analyzed the dynamics of the various connectedness measures over time, in this
section we focus on the global nancial crisis, from 2007 through the end of 2008. The
analysis of this section shows how the measurement and daily monitoring of connectedness
can help us understand the developments at each stage of the global nancial crisis.
4.4.1 Total Connectedness at Various Stages of the Crisis
As of the end of 2006 there were already some, albeit weak, signs of slowdown in the U.S.
real estate market.27 In late February 2007, the New Century Financial Corporation was
reported to have troubles in servicing its debt. It was followed by the bankruptcy of three
small mortgage companies. These in turn worsened the expectations about the real estate
markets, the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets as well as the stock market, and
on the last day of February 2007, the total connectedness measure jumped by more than 17
points, the biggest increase on a single day. The increase in the total connectedness was not
27The Case-Shiller home price index for 20 metropolitan regions was 2% lower in January 2007 compared
to its historical high level reached in July 2006.
27due to a volatility shock to the stock of a single nancial institution; rather, all bank stocks
were aected by the recent developments in the MBS markets.
The churning in the MBS markets continued from February until early June. New Cen-
tury declared bankruptcy in April. In June and July the markets became aware that big
nancial institutions were not insulated from the debacle in the MBS. Bear Stearns had to
liquidate two of its hedge funds in July, leading to billions of dollars of losses. From early
March to late June the total volatility connectedness index climbed gradually from 73 to
80% (see Figure 2).
In July 2007, the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) showed signs of
drying up, which eventually led to the liquidity crisis of August 2007. From July 25 to
August 10, the index climbed 12 percentage points, to reach 88% (see Figure 2). Reecting
the developments over the period, the total connectedness index doubled in the rst eight
months of 2007. After the liquidity crisis of August 2007, it was obvious that the whole
nancial system would be badly bruised by the collapse of the ABCP market.
After seven months of learning about the problems in MBS markets and the ensuing
liquidity crisis, next came the months of reckoning with the consequences as nearly all U.S.
banks started to announce huge losses. Even though it had already reached its historical
maximum, in late 2007 the volatility connectedness index continued its upward move by
several points.
As the MBS markets continued their descent in early 2008 Bear Stearns' nancial position
became untenable. Amid widespread rumors of an eventual bankruptcy, its stock price
declined rapidly in mid-March, briey increasing the tensions and volatility in the markets.
In an operation directed by the New York Fed, J.P. Morgan acquired Bear Stearns on March
17, 2008 with nancial assistance from the Fed. As a result of the timely rescue operation,
in the nal days of Bear Stearns the total connectedness of the surviving thirteen banks
showed an upward movement of only a couple of percentage points.
In the summer of 2008 the tension in the stock market had started to build up again as a
result of Wachovia Bank's troubles. Thanks to Wachovia's high volatility, the total volatility
connectedness index increased, reaching to 88.5% in mid-July (see Figure 2).
In the meantime, regional banks smaller than Wachovia failed. These were followed by
news about the constantly deteriorating asset positions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Before going bankrupt, these two "government-sponsored enterprises" were taken into gov-
ernment conservatorship in the rst week of September.
Then came the most signicant event in the unfolding of the crisis. Following the news
28Market Cap.
Institution Ticker Business (12/29/2006) Important Events
Bear Stearns BSC I-Bank 19 Acquired by JPM 3/17/2008
Lehman Brothers LEH I-Bank 41 Bankruptcy 9/15/2008
Merrill Lynch MER I-Bank 82 Acquired by BAC 9/15/2008
Wachovia Bank WB C-Bank 115 Acquired by WFC 10/3/2008
Table 4: Detail for Financial Institutions Acquired or Bankrupted During the Crisis of 2007-
2008. I-Bank denotes an investment bank, and C-Bank denotes a commercial bank. Market capitalizations
are in billions of U.S. dollars.
that Lehman would announce huge losses in its latest nancial statement, market participants
started selling Lehman Brothers' stock. Despite the overwhelming eorts over the weekend
of September 13-14, no viable takeover bid could be produced for Lehman Brothers by the
interested institutions. The U.S. government did not want to step in to save Lehman Brothers
with taxpayers' money. As soon as Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on the morning of
September 15, 2008 all hell broke out in nancial markets around the world. That same day,
the weakest of the three remaining investment banks, Merrill Lynch, announced it was being
acquired by Bank of America. The total volatility connectedness index increased further to
reach its maximum level of 89.2% (see Figure 2).
After months of gyrations in the U.S. nancial system, the volatility connectedness started
to subside toward the end of the rst quarter of 2009. In March and April 2009, the total
connectedness measure uctuated between 80-85% for a while. It started to fall only after
the announcement of the stress test results in May 2009. By October 2009 the index was
down to 70%. However, the news coming from Greece and the EU's inability to handle the
Greek debt crisis in an orderly manner led to further volatility in nancial industry stocks
in the EU and the U.S., which prevented the volatility connectedness index from declining
any further. As of the end of our sample, the index was uctuating between 70 and 75%, a
range that is above the levels the index attained during tranquil times (See Figure 2).
4.4.2 Pairwise Connectedness of Troubled Financial Institutions
So far we have discussed the behavior of the total connectedness and total directional con-
nectedness measures for a group of thirteen institutions along with the background of the
events that took place in the U.S. nancial markets during the nancial crisis of 2007-2008.
Our analysis did not include four major banks that disappeared during the crisis through
29bankruptcy or acquisitions. In the remainder of this section, we analyze the total directional
and pairwise directional connectedness measures for these four institutions as well as for AIG
and Morgan Stanley, two other troubled institutions. In Table 4 we list the information on
the four major banks that ceased to exist, with information on their stock tickers, market










































































Figure 6: Net Total Directional Connectedness of Troubled Financial Firms. Net total direc-
tional connectedness for rm i is \from i to others" less \from others to i."
Net total directional connectedness plots for AIG, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns are presented in Figure 6.28 Let us spell out
the most important observation in Figure 6 upfront: Even though it was the troubles of
the investment banks that were followed the most throughout the crisis, Wachovia Bank is
28It is worth noting that connectedness measurements generally will not, and should not, be robust to
the choice of reference universe. Hence, given a decision as to the x to be examined, a second important
issue is precisely which (and hence how many) x's to use. For example, in this paper's analysis of individual
nancial institution equity return volatilities, we intentionally use only the largest rms. In addition, note
that our reference universe will change with the \births" and \deaths" of nancial rms. Births happen,
for example, when a rm goes public, as with Goldman Sachs in 1999, and deaths happen when rms go
bankrupt, as with Lehman Brothers in 2008.
30the one that had the highest net total and pairwise volatility connectedness in the climactic
months of the second half of 2008.
Coming back to the four troubled investment banks, it was true that they had high net
connectedness on several occasions as the global nancial crisis unfolded steadily in 2007 and
2008. To start with the most vulnerable of the top ve investment banks, the net volatility
connectedness of Bear Stearns' stock was not sizable in the run-up to its takeover by J.P.
Morgan on March 17, 2008, but it increased substantially to 6.4% on March 14 and 4.9% on
March 17 (see Figure 6).
Viewed as the most vulnerable investment bank after Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers'
net directional connectedness during the liquidity crisis of August 2007 was close to 5%.
It also generated close to 4% net directional connectedness on the day Bear Stearns was
taken over by J.P. Morgan (Figure 6). Furthermore, its net directional connectedness stayed
around 2% for almost three months after the demise of Bear Stearns. From early June till
early August 2008 Lehman Brothers stayed as a net receiver of volatility shocks. This status,
however, did not last for long. Lehman again became one of the front runners in terms of
net directional connectedness (close to 4%) in the rst 20 days of August.
On Friday, September 12, 2008, just one day before the critical weekend, Lehman Brothers
was not at the center stage in terms of volatility connectedness; its net total directional
volatility connectedness was less than 1% (see Figure 6). Markets were still expecting another
government-orchestrated rescue operation. Only after the announcement of its bankruptcy
on the morning of September 15 did Lehman Brothers' stock move to center stage in the crisis
and generated substantial volatility connectedness, with a net total directional connectedness
of 6% (see Figure 6). Its net pairwise connectedness with ve nancial stocks was in the top
percentile (another ve were in the top ve percentiles and two in the top ten percentiles) of
all the net pairwise volatility connectedness that took place between June 1 and December
31 of 2008 (Figure 7(b)). Lehman Brothers' net pairwise directional connectedness increased
substantially in the last two trading days of the stock, September 16 and 17 (see Figures 7(c)
and 7(d)).
As we have already emphasized above in Figure 6, among the six troubled banks Wachovia
was the one that had the highest net directional connectedness with other stocks. Wachovia's
problems had already been known in 2007, yet the markets learned that they were actually
worse than previously known when the bank announced that it incurred a loss of $8.9 billion
in the second quarter of 2008. In the month of June, long before the climax month (September




































































(d) Sep. 17, 2008
Figure 7: Net Pairwise Directional Connectedness During the Lehman Bankruptcy. Notes:
We show the most important directional connections among the pairs of sixteen bank stocks on each day.
Black, red and orange links (black, gray and light gray when viewed in grayscale) correspond to the rst,
fth and tenth percentiles of all net pairwise directional connections from June 1 to December 31, 2008.
Node size indicates stock market capitalization.
32total directional connectedness to others (see Figure 6) increased substantially. On October
3, Wachovia was sold to Wells Fargo.
5 Concluding Remarks
Schweitzer et al. (2009) provide an insightful description of the challenges of nancial network
modeling:
\In the complex-network context, 'links' are not binary (existing or not existing),
but are weighted according to the economic interaction under consideration...
Furthermore, links represent traded volumes, invested capital, and so on, and
their weight can change over time." [p. 423]
We hope to have successfully confronted the issues raised by Schweitzer et al., proposing con-
nectedness measures at all levels { from system-wide to pairwise { that are rigorous in theory
and readily implemented in practice, that capture the dierent strengths of dierent connec-
tions, and that capture time-variation in connectedness. Our approach eectively marries
VAR variance-decomposition theory and network topology theory, recognizing that variance
decompositions of VARs form weighted directed networks, characterizing connectedness in
those networks, and in turn characterizing connectedness in the VAR.
We see our paper as part of a vibrant emergent literature using network perspectives
in economic contexts, and introducing economic perspectives in network contexts. Leading
examples include Acemoglu et al. (2010), Adamic et al. (2010), Allen et al. (2010), and
Billio et al. (2010). Indeed Billio et al. (2010) is our closest relative, using pairwise Granger-
causality to characterize network structure. The Granger-causal approach is in some respects
less appealing than ours (e.g., it is directional but exclusively pairwise and unweighted,
testing zero vs. nonzero coecients, with arbitrary signicance levels, and without tracking
the magnitude of non-zero coecients), and in other respects more appealing (e.g., there is
no need for identifying assumptions, which are inescapable in variance-decomposition and
impulse-response analyses), and the two are surely complements rather than substitutes.
In any event it seems clear that the network and multivariate time series literatures have
much to learn from each other, and that their blending may have much to contribute to the
successful measurement of nancial economic risks.
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